dc.contributor.author | Melkonyan, Tigran | en_GB |
dc.contributor.author | Pingle, Mark | en_GB |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-02-19T11:17:18Z | en_GB |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-19T15:58:38Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009-07-08 | en_GB |
dc.description.abstract | Using a subclass of the α-maximin expected-utility preference model,
in which the decision maker’s degree of ambiguity and degree of pessimism are
each parameterized, we present a theory of religious choice in the Pascalian decision
theory tradition, one that can resolve dilemmas, address the “many Gods objection,”
and address the ambiguity inherent in religious choice. Parameterizing both the degree
of ambiguity and the degree of pessimism allows one to examine how the two interact
to impact choice, which is useful regardless of the application. Applying this model
to religious choice is a move beyond subjective expected-utility theory, allowing us to
show that a change in either the degree of ambiguity or the degree of pessimism can
lead a decision maker to “convert” from one religion to another. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 69, Issue 3, pp. 417 - 438 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11238-009-9164-0 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10036/4325 | en_GB |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Springer | en_GB |
dc.subject | choice of religion | en_GB |
dc.subject | α-maximin expected utility | en_GB |
dc.title | Ambiguity, pessimism, and rational religious choice | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2013-02-19T11:17:18Z | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-19T15:58:38Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0040-5833 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Theory and Decision | en_GB |