dc.contributor.author | Kirchkamp, Oliver | en_GB |
dc.contributor.author | Poen, Eva | en_GB |
dc.contributor.author | Reiß, J. Philipp | en_GB |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-02-19T11:39:31Z | en_GB |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-19T15:58:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008-03-26 | en_GB |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we study equilibrium and experimental bidding behaviour in first-price and second-price auctions with outside options.
We find that bidders do respond to outside options and to variations of common knowledge about competitors’ outside options. However, overbidding in first-price auctions is significantly higher with outside options than without. First-price auctions yield more revenue than second-price auctions. This revenue-premium is significantly higher with outside options. In second-price auctions the introduction of outside options has only a small effect. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 53, Issue 2, pp. 153 - 169 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.03.005 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10036/4327 | en_GB |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.subject | Auction | en_GB |
dc.subject | Outside options | en_GB |
dc.subject | Experiments | en_GB |
dc.subject | Revenue-premium | en_GB |
dc.subject | First-price auction | en_GB |
dc.subject | Second-price auction | en_GB |
dc.subject | Overbidding | en_GB |
dc.subject | Strategy method | en_GB |
dc.title | Outside options: another reason to choose the first-price auction | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2013-02-19T11:39:31Z | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-19T15:58:42Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0014-2921 | en_GB |
dc.description | Pre-print draft dated October 2005. Final version published by Elsevier; available online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.03.005 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | European Economic Review | en_GB |