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dc.contributor.authorKoulovatianos, Christosen_GB
dc.contributor.authorMirman, Leonard J.en_GB
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-14T11:17:31Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-25T10:26:01Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:50:47Z
dc.date.issued2007-03en_GB
dc.description.abstractWe analyze imperfect competition in dynamic environments where firms use rivalrous but nonexcludable industry-specific capital that is provided exogenously. Capital depreciation depends on utilization, so firms influence the evolution of the capital equipment through more or less intensive supply in the final-goods market. Strategic incentives stem from, (i) a dynamic externality, arising due to the non-excludability of the capital stock, leading firms to compete for its use (rivalry), and, (ii) a market externality, leading to the classic Cournot-type supply competition. Comparing alternative market structures, we isolate the effect of these externalities on strategies and industry growth.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Theory, Vol. 133, March 2007, pp. 199-218en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.008en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/77376en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherElsevieren_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220531en_GB
dc.subjectCournot competitionen_GB
dc.subjectoligopolistic non-cooperative dynamic gamesen_GB
dc.titleThe effects of market structure on industry growth: rivalrous nonexcludable capitalen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2009-08-14T11:17:31Zen_GB
dc.date.available2011-01-25T10:26:01Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:50:47Z
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531en_GB
dc.descriptionAuthor's draft issued as working paper dated September 2005. Final version available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com/en_GB
dc.identifier.eissn1095-7235
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Economic Theoryen_GB


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