International environmental agreements under uncertainty: does the veil of uncertainty help?

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International environmental agreements under uncertainty: does the veil of uncertainty help?

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dc.contributor.author Finus, Michael en_GB
dc.contributor.author Pintassilgo, Pedro en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2010-04-20T11:31:00Z en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-25T10:25:55Z en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2013-03-19T15:53:23Z
dc.date.issued 2010 en_GB
dc.description.abstract Na and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce uncertainty about the environmental impact of emissions and the cost of reducing them, this conclusion is intriguing. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we analyze whether the result carries over to a more general setting without restriction on the number of players and which considers not only no and full learning but also partial learning. Second, we test whether the conclusion also holds if there is uncertainty about abatement costs instead of uncertainty about the benefits from global abatement. Third, we propose a transfer scheme that mitigates the possible negative effect of learning and which may even transform it into a positive effect. en_GB
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10036/96900 en_GB
dc.language.iso en en_GB
dc.publisher University of Exeter Business School en_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics Department discussion papers series en_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries 10/03 en_GB
dc.relation.url http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/topics/economics/outputs/publication/?id=624 en_GB
dc.subject environmental agreements en_GB
dc.subject transnational cooperation en_GB
dc.subject uncertainty en_GB
dc.subject self-enforcing en_GB
dc.title International environmental agreements under uncertainty: does the veil of uncertainty help? en_GB
dc.type Working Paper en_GB
dc.date.available 2010-04-20T11:31:00Z en_GB
dc.date.available 2011-01-25T10:25:55Z en_US
dc.date.available 2013-03-19T15:53:23Z
dc.identifier.issn 1473-3307 en_GB
dc.description Working paper en_GB


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