Preordered service in contract enforcement
dc.contributor.author | Auerbach, JU | |
dc.contributor.author | Fonseca, MA | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-04-24T14:46:19Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-04-22 | |
dc.description.abstract | To address delay and backlog at civil courts, we propose a procedural rule that we refer to as preordered service to replace sequential service of low-profile cases for breach of contract. Courts preannounce a list that uses uniquely identifying information to rank potential low-profile contracts, like a combination of contracting parties’ taxpayer numbers. They use this list to schedule initial hearings of filed low-profile contract cases in that order. In theory, unlike sequential service, preordered service ensures efficiency in a population of investment games through unraveling. Results from a laboratory experiment suggest that it may substantially reduce court caseloads. | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 122, pp. 130-149 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.007 | |
dc.identifier.grantnumber | ES/N00762X/1 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/120790 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Under embargo until 22 April 2021 in compliance with publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2020. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_GB |
dc.subject | Judicial system | en_GB |
dc.subject | courts | en_GB |
dc.subject | judiciary performance | en_GB |
dc.subject | legal procedure | en_GB |
dc.subject | civil cases | en_GB |
dc.subject | caseload | en_GB |
dc.subject | contract enforcement | en_GB |
dc.subject | population of investment games | en_GB |
dc.subject | unraveling | en_GB |
dc.subject | experiments | en_GB |
dc.title | Preordered service in contract enforcement | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2020-04-24T14:46:19Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Games and Economic Behavior | en_GB |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2020 | |
exeter.funder | ::Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) | en_GB |
rioxxterms.version | AM | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2020-04-22 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2020-04-24T14:40:01Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | VoR | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2020. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/