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Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence

dc.contributor.authorFonseca, MA
dc.contributor.authorGiovannoni, F
dc.contributor.authorMakris, M
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-01T12:33:12Z
dc.date.issued2020-08-03
dc.description.abstractWe consider auctions where bidders’ valuations are positively correlated with their productivity in a second-stage aftermarket. We test in the lab whether bidders recognize the opportunity to signal their productivity through their bidding and, conditional on them doing so, whether disclosing different information about the auction outcomes affects their signaling behavior. Our results confirm that bidders recognize the signaling opportunities they face and also react to differences in the way their bidding behavior is disclosed, although not always in a way that is consistent with theoretical predictions.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipBritish Academyen_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipUniversity of Bristolen_GB
dc.identifier.citationPublished online 3 August 2020en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00182-020-00725-1
dc.identifier.grantnumberSG113004en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/121732
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagen_GB
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2020. Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licen ses/by/4.0/.
dc.subjectauctionsen_GB
dc.subjectsignalingen_GB
dc.subjectdisclosureen_GB
dc.subjectexperimentsen_GB
dc.titleAuctions with external incentives: experimental evidenceen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2020-07-01T12:33:12Z
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276
dc.descriptionThis is the final version. Available on open access from Springer Verlag via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.journalInternational Journal of Game Theoryen_GB
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0en_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2020-07-01
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2020-07-01
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2020-07-01T08:04:06Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.dateFOA2020-08-20T13:10:49Z
refterms.panelCen_GB


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© The Author(s) 2020. Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licen ses/by/4.0/.
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © The Author(s) 2020. Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licen ses/by/4.0/.