Strategic stability and the proliferation of conventional precision strike: a (bounded) case for optimism?

Abstract

What are the potential deterrent advantages of long-range conventional precision strike (LRCPS) acquisition by new possessor states? Using the case of Poland, this article argues that such LRCPS proliferation offers two possible deterrent benefits. First, it strengthens its possessors’ ability to threaten aggressors with costs in the form of both counterforce denial and countervalue punishment, thereby reducing dependence on great-power allies’ extended-deterrent commitments. Second, it provides a new threat-proximate center of retaliatory decision, thereby strengthening the credibility of great-power allies’ extended-deterrent commitments. However, while LRCPS capabilities may indeed bring certain advantages, they may also exacerbate political hostilities, incentivize intra-crisis escalation, and fail to provide adequate survivability or penetrability to actually deliver their purported deterrent effects in practice. As such, the overall consequences of such proliferation for strategic stability and associated international security are ambiguous, thereby meriting case-by-case analysis. If they are pursued nonetheless, moreover, then a countervailing combination of operational and strategic measures may be employed to reduce both first-strike temptations and adversaries’ broader fears.