Auctions with leaks about early bids: analysis and experimental behavior
dc.contributor.author | Fischer, S | |
dc.contributor.author | Guth, W | |
dc.contributor.author | Kaplan, TR | |
dc.contributor.author | Zultan, R | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-07-20T08:58:01Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-10-26 | |
dc.description.abstract | In sequential first- and second-price private value auctions, second movers are informed about the first movers’ bid with commonly known probability. Equilibrium bidding in first-price auctions is mostly unaffected, but there are multiple equilibria in second-price auctions affecting comparative statics across price rules. We show experimentally that informational leaks in first-price auctions qualitatively confirm the theoretical predictions. In second-price auctions, we analyze and experimentally confirm the existence of focal equilibria, and provide evidence for individual consistency in equilibrium selection. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Published online 26 October 2020 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/ecin.12953 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/122011 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Wiley / Western Economic Association International | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2020 The Authors. Economic Inquiry published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Western Economic Association International. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. | |
dc.subject | auctions | en_GB |
dc.subject | espionage | en_GB |
dc.subject | collusion | en_GB |
dc.subject | laboratory experiments | en_GB |
dc.title | Auctions with leaks about early bids: analysis and experimental behavior | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2020-07-20T08:58:01Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0095-2583 | |
dc.description | This is the final version. Available on open access from Wiley via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Economic Inquiry | en_GB |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2020-07-14 | |
rioxxterms.version | VoR | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2020-07-14 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2020-07-20T08:56:46Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | AM | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2020-10-27T15:24:20Z | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2020 The Authors. Economic Inquiry published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Western Economic Association International.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.