Political competition over property rights enforcement
dc.contributor.author | Auerbach, JU | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-01-29T09:11:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-11-19 | |
dc.description.abstract | I study what level of tax-financed property rights enforcement societies choose in elections when appropriators can steal from producers. Restrictions determine who can run for office. Candidates propose enforcement levels and tax rates. The election winner keeps the budget surplus. If the majority of voters are producers, then fewer restrictions on who can run for office are associated with more secure property rights. Lifting restrictions on who can run benefits producers, while lifting restrictions on who can vote does not. If the majority of voters are appropriators, then elections lead to adverse outcomes, irrespective of who can run for office. | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | Center for Research in Economics and Strategy (CRES) in the Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 131, article 103604 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103604 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/124547 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Under embargo until 19 November 2022 in compliance with publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2020. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_GB |
dc.subject | Political process | en_GB |
dc.subject | Political institution | en_GB |
dc.subject | Political competition | en_GB |
dc.subject | Property rights | en_GB |
dc.title | Political competition over property rights enforcement | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2021-01-29T09:11:48Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0014-2921 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | European Economic Review | en_GB |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2020-10-30 | |
rioxxterms.version | AM | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2020-11-30 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2021-01-29T09:06:06Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | AM | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2020. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/