Strategic disaggregation in matching markets
dc.contributor.author | Nei, S | |
dc.contributor.author | Pakzad-Hurson, B | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-08-05T14:35:45Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021-08-12 | |
dc.description.abstract | Decisions agents make before and after matching can be strategically linked through the match. We demonstrate this linkage in a game where universities either require students to commit to majors before matriculating or allow students to pick majors during their studies. The interaction between “matching forces” (competition for higher quality students) and “principal-agent forces” (moral hazard and adverse selection) leads to two equilibria that mirror the admissions systems in the US and England. With monetary transfers, our model provides insights into athletic scholarships. Payment caps that restrict transfers to potential athletes who decide not to play sports can maximize welfare. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Article 105329 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105329 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/126670 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Under embargo until 12 February 2023 in compliance with publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.rights | ©2021 Published by Elsevier. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_GB |
dc.subject | matching with contracts | en_GB |
dc.subject | college admissions | en_GB |
dc.subject | athletic scholarships | en_GB |
dc.title | Strategic disaggregation in matching markets | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2021-08-05T14:35:45Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Journal of Economic Theory | en_GB |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2021-08-02 | |
rioxxterms.version | AM | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2021-08-02 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2021-08-05T13:44:49Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | AM | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as ©2021 Published by Elsevier. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/