Agency over technocracy: how lawyer archetypes infect regulatory approaches: the FCA example
dc.contributor.author | Clark, T | |
dc.contributor.author | Moorhead, R | |
dc.contributor.author | Vaughan, S | |
dc.contributor.author | Brener, A | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-15T14:55:19Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022-04-06 | |
dc.date.updated | 2021-11-15T12:30:34Z | |
dc.description.abstract | In this article, we look at the contested role of in-house lawyers in regulated organisations in the financial sector. A recent Financial Conduct Authority consultation on whether to designate the head of legal of banks, insurance companies and other financial firms as ‘Senior Managers’ and the decision which flowed from it, reflected a flawed view of lawyers as a neutral technocracy of mere legal technicians; we show how the FCA’s decision is potentially damaging to the public interest and failed to take into account that in-house lawyers are often important decision-makers and influencers within their organisations. We put the case for an alternative view; that in-house lawyers are professionals, with agency that requires them to act in accordance with ethical norms and means they should be made more accountable for their conduct. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Published online 6 April 2022 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/1460728x.2022.2059742 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/127811 | |
dc.identifier | ORCID: 0000-0003-1765-4134 (Moorhead, Richard) | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Routledge | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. | en_GB |
dc.title | Agency over technocracy: how lawyer archetypes infect regulatory approaches: the FCA example | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-15T14:55:19Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1757-8450 | |
dc.description | This is the final version. Available on open access from Routledge via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Legal Ethics | en_GB |
dc.relation.ispartof | Legal Ethics | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2021-09-24 | |
rioxxterms.version | VoR | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2021-09-24 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2021-11-15T12:30:36Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | AM | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2022-04-28T12:48:23Z | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.