dc.contributor.author | Girard, R | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T15:40:55Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022-12-12 | |
dc.date.updated | 2021-11-26T15:17:46Z | |
dc.description.abstract | Populists are typically impatient with intermediaries, institutions (including legislatures and courts) and liberal-democratic procedures, which are seen as illegitimately thwarting the direct expression of the authentic “will of the people.” Taking advantage of the spatio-temporal contours of liberal democracy, populism puts forward an alternative conception of democratic representation, one that not only aims to reduce the distance between gouvernants and gouvernés but also is, as populists would indirectly claim, better suited to the contemporary imperatives of temporal efficiency and rapidity. Yet, it is precisely in this context—which I call “constitutional impatience”—that courts can provide a judicial response to populism. In this article, I argue that courts have shown that they can, in certain circumstances, act as institutional stabilisers by slowing down the populist tempo and counteracting the populist tendency to avoid or bypass institutional intermediaries such as Parliament and the courts. I do so by reference, mainly, to two high-profile UK Supreme Court cases, Miller (no. 1) and Miller (no. 2)/Cherry. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 8, pp. 35 - 61 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/127955 | |
dc.identifier | ORCID: 0000-0002-1658-5950 (Girard, Raphael) | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy, University of Wisconsin–Madison | en_GB |
dc.relation.url | https://constitutionalstudies.wisc.edu/index.php/cs/article/view/88 | |
dc.rights | © 2022 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System | |
dc.subject | Populism | en_GB |
dc.subject | constitutional impatience | en_GB |
dc.subject | courts | en_GB |
dc.subject | institutional stabilisation | en_GB |
dc.subject | judicial deceleration | en_GB |
dc.subject | executive aggrandisement | en_GB |
dc.subject | Miller | en_GB |
dc.subject | United Kingdom | en_GB |
dc.title | Populism, executive power and 'constitutional impatience': courts as institutional stabilisers in the United Kingdom | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T15:40:55Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2474-9427 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy at the University of Wisconsin–Madison via the URL in this record | en_GB |
dc.description | Note that this article, and the issue of the journal Constitutional Studies in which it appeared, was originally published for the Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy, University of Wisconsin–Madison on 30 November 2022 by the Global Roundtable of the International Association of Constitutional Law (IACL) at https://www.iacl-democracy-2020.org/journal-issue | |
dc.identifier.eissn | 2474-9419 | |
dc.identifier.journal | Constitutional Studies | en_GB |
dc.rights.uri | http://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2021-11-16 | |
rioxxterms.version | AM | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2021-11-16 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2021-11-26T15:17:48Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | AM | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2022-12-07T15:20:07Z | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |