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Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs

dc.contributor.authorKaplan, T
dc.contributor.authorSela, A
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-18T13:51:05Z
dc.date.issued2022-09-19
dc.date.updated2022-10-18T12:59:52Z
dc.description.abstractWe study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have two potentially different, commonly known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, does not benefit from these entry costs. We calculate the equilibrium strategies of the bidders and analyze the optimal design for the seller in this environment in terms of expected entry and the number of potential bidders.en_GB
dc.format.extent62-
dc.identifier.citationVol. 13(5), article 62en_GB
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.3390/g13050062
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/131311
dc.identifierORCID: 0000-0001-5307-743X (Kaplan, Todd)
dc.identifierScopusID: 7006761509 (Kaplan, Todd)
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherMDPIen_GB
dc.rights© 2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).en_GB
dc.subjectasymmetric auctionsen_GB
dc.subjectentry costsen_GB
dc.titleSecond-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costsen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2022-10-18T13:51:05Z
dc.identifier.issn2073-4336
dc.descriptionThis is the final version. Available on open access from MDPI via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.eissn2073-4336
dc.identifier.journalGamesen_GB
dc.relation.ispartofGames, 13(5)
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/  en_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2022-09-06
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2022-09-19
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2022-10-18T13:48:33Z
refterms.versionFCDVoR
refterms.dateFOA2022-10-18T13:51:08Z
refterms.panelCen_GB
refterms.dateFirstOnline2022-09-19


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© 2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).