The fruits (and vegetables) of crime: Protection from theft and agricultural development

Abstract

Fear of crime is a concern in developing countries where rule of law is imperfectly enforced. I use a cluster-randomized field experiment in Kenya to show that reducing fear of theft allows small-scale farmers to adjust their planting and time use decisions, as well as increasing crop yields. I randomly allocated subsidized watchmen to farmers in Kenya, reducing their perceived risk of theft. Farmers offered watchmen were 14 p.p. more likely to have crops they grew for the first time or grew on more land as a result of improved security, sold more crops off-farm, and their farm output per acre was larger by 15% of the control mean. The intervention had positive security spillovers, and led to fewer angry disputes among neighbours. Despite these benefits, this intervention isn’t profitable for an individual farmer, suggesting a potential role for collective security interventions.