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dc.contributor.authorCole, M
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-23T08:38:01Z
dc.date.issued2023-09-26
dc.date.updated2023-06-22T14:33:32Z
dc.description.abstractConsiders how the EU's "Intel saga" has changed the conditional rebates regime. Discusses the main case law, the problems of the current data-dependant approach of Intel Corp Inc v European Commission (T-286/09 RENV) (GC), and how the impending appeal offers a chance to clarify the position.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 44(10), pp. 419 - 428en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/133487
dc.identifierORCID: 0000-0003-4797-2256 (Cole, Matthew)
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherSweet and Maxwellen_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder embargo until 26 September 2024 in compliance with publisher policyen_GB
dc.rights© 2023 Sweet and Maxwell
dc.subjectCompetition Lawen_GB
dc.subjectIntel caseen_GB
dc.subjectAbuse of dominanceen_GB
dc.subjectConditional rebatesen_GB
dc.subjectLoyalty Rebatesen_GB
dc.titleNo data, no abuse: the lesson from Intel's "more economic approach"en_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2023-06-23T08:38:01Z
dc.identifier.issn0144-3054
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Sweet and Maxwellen_GB
dc.identifier.journalEuropean Competition Law Reviewen_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/en_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2023-05-03
dcterms.dateSubmitted2023-04-05
rioxxterms.versionAMen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2023-05-03
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2023-06-22T14:33:34Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.dateFOA2024-09-25T23:00:00Z
refterms.panelCen_GB


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