Automatic Puppets, Toy Carts, and Robots: Aristotle’s Metaphysics of Artifacts and the Question of Automata

Abstract

The chapter examines the issue of how automata sit within Aristotle’s complex metaphysics of artifacts. In particular, the question will be raised as to whether the case of automata poses a challenge to Aristotle’s sharp distinction between artificial and natural things and, more specifically, between artificial and living things, which are for Aristotle paradigmatic and eminent instances of natural things. The answer will be that Aristotle’s distinction stands. What is more, the case of automata shows one crucial point of demarcation between organisms and artifacts, i.e., the complete absence in the case of artifacts of an intrinsic or internal teleology. An artifact’s purpose, end, and function essentially depend on the interests and ends of its creator. And this applies even to such complex artifacts as automata. The analysis focuses on three main texts and contexts, which describe an increasing level of engagement on Aristotle’s part with the metaphysical import of automata and automatic analogies: Aristotle’s explanation of the motion of animals in On the Movement of Animals; his account of embryological development in On the Generation of Animals, Book 2; and finally Aristotle’s suggestive fantasy, in Book 1 of the Politics, of a world in which slaves are replaced by robot-style artifacts.