Plotinus and the identity theory of truth

Abstract

In this paper I argue that, in Enn. V 5[32] and V 3[49], Plotinus defends a version of the identity theory of truth – the view that truth consists in a form of identity between what is thought or said and what is the case. For Plotinus, truth obtains only in the Intellect and consists in the identity between the Intellect itself and its objects of thought. I also argue that, similarly to modern identity theorists, Plotinus’ endorsement of the identity theory stems from dissatisfaction with the notion of truth as correspondence. If the best we can do is to think or say things that merely correspond to reality, then we shall never capture the reality we wish to think or say something about and so never attain truth proper. Some scholars have argued that Plotinus’ doctrine of the Intellect in Enn. V 5[32] and V 3[49] is a response to sceptical arguments, such as the ones advanced by Sextus Empiricus in M VII. Others have played down that role of ancient Scepticism in Plotinus’ doctrine of the Intellect. While maintaining that Scepticism does play a role in Plotinus’ epistemology, I finally contend that this role can be fully clarified only if one looks at his doctrine of truth as identity.