dc.contributor.author | Stroup, Caleb | |
dc.contributor.author | Zissimos, Ben | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-06-30T10:00:24Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-04 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper proposes an answer to the question of why social unrest sometimes occurs in the
wake of an IMF Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Under certain circumstances, partly
determined by a country’s comparative advantage, a nation’s elite may have an incentive to
make transfers to the rest of society through government employment in order to quell social
unrest. But under an SAP, the elite are constrained from making such transfers and
consequently social unrest may arise. The paper proposes a framework from which a
prediction can be made about the circumstances under which social unrest can be expected to
occur. It then takes this prediction to the data and finds empirical support for it. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/15120 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | MIT Press | en_GB |
dc.relation.url | http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/economics-conflict | en_GB |
dc.subject | International Monetary Fund (IMF) | en_GB |
dc.subject | social unrest | en_GB |
dc.subject | structural adjustment | en_GB |
dc.subject | trade integration | en_GB |
dc.title | Social unrest in the wake of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs | en_GB |
dc.type | Book chapter | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2014-06-30T10:00:24Z | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978-0262026895 | |
exeter.article-number | Working Paper No. 4211 | |
dc.description | types: Book chapter | en_GB |
dc.description | Working paper. Published as chapter 8 of The economics of social conflict: theory and empirical evidence; edited by Karl Wärneryd (CESifo Seminar Series) MIT Press, Cambridge Mass., 2014. ISBN 9780262026895 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | CESifo Seminar Series | en_GB |