An experimental study on the effect of ambiguity in a coordination game
le Roux, Sara
Theory and Decision: an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision sciences
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We report an experimental test of the influence of ambiguity on behaviour in a coordination game. We study the behaviour of subjects in the presence of ambiguity and attempt to determine whether they prefer to choose an ambiguity-safe option. We find that this strategy, which is not played in either Nash equilibrium or iterated dominance equilibrium, is indeed chosen quite frequently. This provides evidence that ambiguity-aversion influences behaviour in games. While the behaviour of the Row Player is consistent with randomising between her strategies, the Column Player shows a marked preference for avoiding ambiguity and choosing his ambiguity-safe strategy.
“The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9483-2”."
This paper is based on a chapter from Sara le Roux’s PhD thesis.
Vol. 79 (4), pp 667-688