How much of the free will problem does (the right kind of) indeterminism solve?
Dupré, John
Date: 31 January 2013
Article
Journal
Philosophical Inquiries
Publisher
Edizioni ETS
Publisher DOI
Abstract
This paper takes up an idea that has interested me for some years: the idea that, contrary to a very widely shared assumption, a radically indeterministic metaphysics does provide a way of understanding human freedom as a real and important feature of the world. However, whereas I used to think of this as a solution to the free will ...
This paper takes up an idea that has interested me for some years: the idea that, contrary to a very widely shared assumption, a radically indeterministic metaphysics does provide a way of understanding human freedom as a real and important feature of the world. However, whereas I used to think of this as a solution to the free will problem within the tradition of radical voluntarism, I now prefer to present it under the rubric of indeterminist compatibilism. In the most crucial respects this position remains true to the voluntarist tradition, but in its current incarnation it aims to capture the powerful intuitions that underlie compatibilist thinking.
Social and Political Sciences, Philosophy, and Anthropology
Faculty of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences
Item views 0
Full item downloads 0