An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
Journal of Economic Theory
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In a class of informed principal problems with common values, we define iteratively a particular allocation which we call the assured allocation. It is comparatively easy to calculate and straightforward to interpret. It always exists, is unique and continuous in the priors. It is undominated, i.e. efficient among the different types of the principal subject to the agent's interim participation constraint. It is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the three-stage game in Myerson  and Maskin and Tirole . It dominates the RSW allocation as defined in Maskin and Tirole  and coincides with it when the latter is undominated. It is the unique neutral optimum as defined in Myerson  when there are only two types. When the assured allocation is separating, then it is a neutral optimum with three or more types. It is an equilibrium of a game of competition in a market with adverse selection.
This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in the Journal of Economic Theory. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in The Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 157, pp. 918-958 doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.007
Vol. 157, pp. 918 - 958