dc.contributor.author | Myles, Gareth D. | |
dc.contributor.author | Ismail, R | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-07-30T08:39:40Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015-07-29 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates the effects of a graduate tax when the return to education is uncertain and wages are determined through equilibrium in a labor market with signalling. The consequence of uncertainty is that both ability and initial wealth matter for educational choice. Compared to a constrained first-best the market outcome with uncertainty and signalling results in an inefficiently high number of people entering higher education. Due to the positive wealth effect over-entry is proportionately greater for high-wealth individuals. The graduate tax reduces entry into education so enhances efficiency. However, it has undesirable distributional consequences: low-wealth individuals are deterred from entering education but high-wealth are encouraged. In this respect, the graduate tax has clear failings as a method of financing higher education. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Available online 14 August 2015 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.rie.2015.07.008 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/17982 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2015. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_GB |
dc.subject | Higher Education, Uncertainty, Signalling, Graduate Tax | en_GB |
dc.title | The Graduate Tax when Education is a Signal | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 1090-9443 | |
dc.description | This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Research in Economics. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Research in Economics | en_GB |
refterms.dateFOA | 2019-12-13T09:00:44Z | |