Market Design and the Stability of General Equilibrium
Goeree, JK; Lindsay, L
Date: 22 April 2016
Article
Journal
Journal of Economic Theory
Publisher
Elsevier
Publisher DOI
Abstract
We employ laboratory methods to study the stability of competitive equilibrium in Scarf’s economy (International Economic Review, 1960). Tatonnement theory predicts that prices are globally unstable for this economy, i.e. unless prices start at the competitive equilibrium they oscillate without converging. Anderson et al. (Journal of ...
We employ laboratory methods to study the stability of competitive equilibrium in Scarf’s economy (International Economic Review, 1960). Tatonnement theory predicts that prices are globally unstable for this economy, i.e. unless prices start at the competitive equilibrium they oscillate without converging. Anderson et al. (Journal of Economic Theory, 2004) report that in laboratory double auction markets, prices in the Scarf economy do indeed oscillate with no clear sign of convergence. We replicate their experiments and confirm that tatonnement theory predicts the direction of price changes remarkably well. Prices are globally unstable with adverse effects for the economy’s efficiency and the equitable distribution of the gains from trade. We also introduce a novel market mechanism where participants submit demand schedules and prices are computed using Smale’s global Newtonian dynamic (American Economic Review, 1976). We show that for the Scarf economy, submitting a competitive schedule, i.e. a set of quantities that maximize utility taking prices as given, is a weakly dominant strategy. The resulting outcome is the unique competitive equilibrium of the Scarf economy. In experiments using the schedule market, prices converge quickly to the competitive equilibrium. Besides stabilizing prices, the schedule market is more efficient and results in highly egalitarian outcomes.
Economics
Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy
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