dc.contributor.author | Cole, M | |
dc.contributor.author | Davies, R | |
dc.contributor.author | Kaplan, TR | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-03-06T12:01:11Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017-03-23 | |
dc.description.abstract | Discrimination against foreign bidders in procurement auctions has typically been
achieved by price preferences, that is, a policy of accepting a range of higher prices
from a domestic firm over a lower price from a foreign firm. We demonstrate that in
the bidding game, each level of protection via a price preference can be achieved by
an equivalent tariff. When government welfare depends only on net expenditures, this
equivalence carries over to the government’s decision. As such, agreements to eliminate
price preferences may be unsuccessful unless accompanied by tariff limitations. On the
other hand, if tariff collection is costly, then even without tariff limits banning price
preferences lowers protection and increases global welfare. | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | The authors acknowledge that this paper is produced
as part of the project “Globalization, Investment and Services Trade (GIST) Marie Curie Initial Training
Network (ITN)” funded by the European Commission under its Seventh Framework Programme - Contract
No. FP7-PEOPLE-ITN-2008-211429. | |
dc.identifier.citation | Available online 23 March 2017 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.03.003 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/26246 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.subject | Government Procurement | en_GB |
dc.subject | Tariffs | en_GB |
dc.subject | Price Preference | en_GB |
dc.title | Protection in government procurement auctions | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-1996 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this record. | |
dc.identifier.journal | Journal of International Economics | en_GB |