dc.contributor.author | Lindsay, L | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-11-03T12:25:09Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017-11-03 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper explores how the Shapley value can be used as the basis of a payment rule
for auctions and exchanges. The standard Shapley value is modified so that losing
bidders do not make or receive any payments. The new rule, called the balanced winner
contribution (BWC) rule, satisfies a variation of Myerson’s balanced contribution
property. The payment rule is fair in the sense that, with respect to reported values,
the members of every pair of traders make equal contributions to each other’s share of
the gains from trade. BWC payments can be used in single-item auctions and more
complex auctions and exchanges with multiple items and package bidding. A series
of examples is presented to illustrate how the BWC rule works and how the payments
compare to those based on competitive prices, the core, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Published online 3 November 2017 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.020 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/30141 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. | |
dc.subject | Shapley value | en_GB |
dc.subject | auctions | en_GB |
dc.subject | exchanges | en_GB |
dc.subject | package bidding | en_GB |
dc.subject | balanced budget | en_GB |
dc.title | Shapley Value Based Pricing for Auctions and Exchanges | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this record. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Games and Economic Behavior | en_GB |