Metaphysical Realism and Objectivity: Some Theoretical Reflections
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018
Reason for embargo
Under embargo until 3 March 2019 in compliance with publisher policy.
In this paper we aim to show an intrinsic contradiction of contemporary Metaphysical Realism by focusing on the relation between the subject and the object. Metaphysical Realism considers facts and objects as being empirical, and therefore they are considered in relation to the subject, while at the same time facts are assumed to belong to an autonomous and independent reality. However, if a real object is considered to be independent from the subject, once it enters in a relation with the latter, a real object must undergo an intrinsic transformation. However, since an object cannot avoid this transformation then recovering the real or “absolute” object from the perceived object is not possible. In this way, the inherent contradiction of the “absolute” as being determined, i.e., defined by virtue of a limit, is revealed.
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer Verlag via the DOI in this record.
First Online: 02 March 2018 pp. 1 - 21