| dc.contributor.author | Reinstein, D | |
| dc.contributor.author | Riener, G | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kellner, C | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-03-09T10:10:46Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018-03-05 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Should fundraisers ask a banker to donate “if he earns a bonus” or wait and ask after the bonus is known?
Standard EU theory predicts these are equivalent; loss-aversion and signaling models predict a larger commitment
before the bonus is known; theories of affect predict the reverse. In five experiments incorporating lab and field
elements (N=1363), we solicited donations from small lottery winnings , varying the conditionality of donations
between participants. Overall, we find conditional donations (“if you win”) exceeded ex-post donations. This
represents the first evidence on how pro-social behavior extends to conditional commitments over uncertain income,
with implications for charitable fundraising, giving pledges, and experimental methodology | en_GB |
| dc.description.sponsorship | We would like to thank the Universities of Essex, Düsseldorf, Mannheim and Bonn for providing financial support
for our research. | en_GB |
| dc.identifier.citation | University of Exeter Working Paper | en_GB |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/32001 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
| dc.publisher | University of Exeter | en_GB |
| dc.subject | Social preferences | en_GB |
| dc.subject | Contingent decision-making | en_GB |
| dc.subject | Signaling | en_GB |
| dc.subject | Field experiments | en_GB |
| dc.subject | Charitable giving | en_GB |
| dc.title | Commitments to Give-if-you-Win Exceed Donations After a Win | en_GB |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en_GB |
| dc.date.available | 2018-01-15 | en_GB |
| dc.date.available | 2018-03-09T10:10:46Z | |
