| dc.description.abstract | This thesis is concerned with the question of what wellbeing consists in, and how well Epicureanism answers that question. In the first part, I compare some modern approaches to wellbeing: desire-satisfaction, objective-list theories, and hedonism. I reject the objective-list approach and accept that desire-satisfactionism is an accurate and useful account of what wellbeing is. However, desire-satisfaction is not basic and can be reduced to hedonism, which is what wellbeing actually consists in. I then reject attitudinal hedonism in favour of a sensational-pleasure definition.
In the second part, I turn to Epicureanism in an attempt to solve some the difficulties that arise from modern hedonistic theories. I set out the main components of Epicurean ethical theory (pleasure, pain, virtue and desire) and clarify and defend my interpretation of them. I defend the view that Epicurus was a pure consequentialist who considered virtue and the careful selection of desires to be valuable only to the extent that they contribute to a pleasant state of feeling. I also support the view that Epicurus considered the absence of pain to be the absolute limit of pleasure.
Finally, I argue that Epicurus is correct in his view, and demonstrate how pleasure cannot be increased past this point. I give an account of how perfect pleasure is varied but not increased beyond painlessness. As a result of this, I conclude that the perfectionist Epicurean approach to pleasure will result in a greater attainment of wellbeing than modern accumulative approaches. | en_GB |
