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dc.contributor.authorGalluzzo, G
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-27T14:45:14Z
dc.date.issued2018-05-15
dc.description.abstractThe paper takes issue with Koslicki’s Neo-Aristotelian Mereology (NAM) and more particularly with her understanding of hylomorphism in mereological terms. NAM centres on two characteristic claims: (i) that Aristotle’s form is a proper part of the composite substance; (ii) that there is a univocal notion of part, and a univocal notion of composition, which apply across the board and to matter and form in particular. The paper shows that both assumptions are questionable within an Aristotelian framework. More in general, it is argued that a strictly mereological approach does not do justice to the complex relationship between matter and form, and that considerations about identity are more crucial than mereology when it comes to understanding Aristotle’s hylomorphism.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. XXVIII (1), pp. 65-87en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1400/257709
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/32255
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherQuodlibeten_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder indefinite embargo due to publisher policy  en_GB
dc.subjectAristotleen_GB
dc.subjectHylomorphismen_GB
dc.subjectParthooden_GB
dc.subjectCompositionen_GB
dc.subjectNeo-Aristotelian Mereologyen_GB
dc.titleAre Matter and Form Parts? Aristotle’s and Neo-Aristotelian Hylomorphismen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.identifier.issn2279-7343
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Quodlibet via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.journalDiscipline Filosoficheen_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2018-03-22


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