A practical guide to setting up your Tax Evasion Game
dc.contributor.author | Malezieux, AE | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-31T10:19:11Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-05-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | Over the last four decades, an important stream of literature has studied tax compliance behaviour in the laboratory through tax evasion games. In this review of over 70 papers, the main results are summarised, highlighting the most prominent features of tax evasion games. The results are interpreted in terms of laboratory tax compliance. Variables that have a positive impact on compliance are a non-student pool of subjects, a loaded frame, a directive way of asking for compliance, a progressive tax regime, redistribution of tax funds, endogenous audits, increased audit probability, larger fines and a one-off tax amnesty. Self-employed income and a complex tax system are expected to have a negative impact, while the impact of earned income, tax rates and public-good funds is unclear and deserves further investigation. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 4 (1), pp. 107-127 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/33035 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Journal of Tax Administration | en_GB |
dc.relation.url | http://jota.website/article/view/168 | en_GB |
dc.subject | tax evasion | en_GB |
dc.subject | tax evasion game | en_GB |
dc.subject | tax compliance game | en_GB |
dc.subject | laboratory experiment | en_GB |
dc.title | A practical guide to setting up your Tax Evasion Game | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2018-05-31T10:19:11Z | |
dc.description | This is the final version of the article. Available on open access from the publisher via the link in this record. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Journal of Tax Administration | en_GB |