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dc.contributor.authorMalezieux, AE
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-31T10:19:11Z
dc.date.issued2018-05-01
dc.description.abstractOver the last four decades, an important stream of literature has studied tax compliance behaviour in the laboratory through tax evasion games. In this review of over 70 papers, the main results are summarised, highlighting the most prominent features of tax evasion games. The results are interpreted in terms of laboratory tax compliance. Variables that have a positive impact on compliance are a non-student pool of subjects, a loaded frame, a directive way of asking for compliance, a progressive tax regime, redistribution of tax funds, endogenous audits, increased audit probability, larger fines and a one-off tax amnesty. Self-employed income and a complex tax system are expected to have a negative impact, while the impact of earned income, tax rates and public-good funds is unclear and deserves further investigation.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 4 (1), pp. 107-127en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/33035
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherJournal of Tax Administrationen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://jota.website/article/view/168en_GB
dc.subjecttax evasionen_GB
dc.subjecttax evasion gameen_GB
dc.subjecttax compliance gameen_GB
dc.subjectlaboratory experimenten_GB
dc.titleA practical guide to setting up your Tax Evasion Gameen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2018-05-31T10:19:11Z
dc.descriptionThis is the final version of the article. Available on open access from the publisher via the link in this record.en_GB
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Tax Administrationen_GB


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