dc.contributor.author | Rahwan, Z | |
dc.contributor.author | Hauser, OP | |
dc.contributor.author | Kochanowska, E | |
dc.contributor.author | Fasolo, B | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-07-27T07:25:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-06-11 | |
dc.description.abstract | We explore the downstream consequences of cheating–and resisting the temptation to cheat–at high stakes on pro-social behaviour and self-perceptions. In a large online sample, we replicate the seminal finding that cheating rates are largely insensitive to stake size, even at a 500-fold increase. We present two new findings. First, resisting the temptation to cheat at high stakes led to negative moral spill-over, triggering a moral license: participants who resisted cheating in the high stakes condition subsequently donated a smaller fraction of their earnings to charity. Second, participants who cheated maximally mispredicted their perceived morality: although such participants thought they were less prone to feeling immoral if they cheated, they ended up feeling more immoral a day after the cheating task than immediately afterwards. We discuss the theoretical implications of our findings on moral balancing and self-deception, and the practical relevance for organisational design. | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | We are grateful to a grant from Google ATAP that funded this research. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Available online 11 June 2018 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.021 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/33554 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Under embargo until 12 December 2019 in compliance with publisher policy. | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | en_GB |
dc.subject | Cheating | en_GB |
dc.subject | Incentives | en_GB |
dc.subject | Moral licensing | en_GB |
dc.subject | Moral self-perceptions | en_GB |
dc.subject | Pro-social behaviour | en_GB |
dc.title | High stakes: A little more cheating, a lot less charity | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 0167-2681 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this record. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | en_GB |