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dc.contributor.authorRahwan, Z
dc.contributor.authorHauser, OP
dc.contributor.authorKochanowska, E
dc.contributor.authorFasolo, B
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-27T07:25:33Z
dc.date.issued2018-06-11
dc.description.abstractWe explore the downstream consequences of cheating–and resisting the temptation to cheat–at high stakes on pro-social behaviour and self-perceptions. In a large online sample, we replicate the seminal finding that cheating rates are largely insensitive to stake size, even at a 500-fold increase. We present two new findings. First, resisting the temptation to cheat at high stakes led to negative moral spill-over, triggering a moral license: participants who resisted cheating in the high stakes condition subsequently donated a smaller fraction of their earnings to charity. Second, participants who cheated maximally mispredicted their perceived morality: although such participants thought they were less prone to feeling immoral if they cheated, they ended up feeling more immoral a day after the cheating task than immediately afterwards. We discuss the theoretical implications of our findings on moral balancing and self-deception, and the practical relevance for organisational design.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipWe are grateful to a grant from Google ATAP that funded this research.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationAvailable online 11 June 2018en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.021
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/33554
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherElsevieren_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder embargo until 12 December 2019 in compliance with publisher policy.en_GB
dc.rights© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_GB
dc.subjectCheatingen_GB
dc.subjectIncentivesen_GB
dc.subjectMoral licensingen_GB
dc.subjectMoral self-perceptionsen_GB
dc.subjectPro-social behaviouren_GB
dc.titleHigh stakes: A little more cheating, a lot less charityen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this record.en_GB
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organizationen_GB


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