dc.contributor.author | Kaplan, TR | |
dc.contributor.author | Ruffle, B | |
dc.contributor.author | Shtudiner, Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-08-09T07:46:57Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-09-04 | |
dc.description.abstract | Efficient cooperation often requires coordination, such that exactly one of two players takes
an available action. If the decisions whether to pursue the action are made simultaneously,
then neither or both may acquiesce leading to an inefficient outcome. However,
inefficiency may be reduced if players move sequentially. We test this experimentally by
introducing repeated two-stage versions of such a game where the action is individually
profitable. In one version, players may wait in the first stage to see what their partner did
and then coordinate in the second stage. In another version, sequential decision-making is
imposed by assigning one player to move in stage one and the other in stage two. Although
there are fewer cooperative decisions in the two-stage treatments, we show that overall
subjects coordinate better on efficient cooperation and on avoiding both acquiescing. Yet,
only some pairs actually achieve higher profits, while the least cooperative pairs do worse
in the two-stage games than their single-stage counterparts. For these, rather than
facilitating coordination, the additional stage invites unsuccessful attempts to disguise
uncooperative play, which are met with punishment. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 154, pp. 206-219 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.08.008 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/33701 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Under embargo until 4 March 2020 in compliance with publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2018. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
dc.subject | experimental economics | en_GB |
dc.subject | cooperation | en_GB |
dc.subject | efficiency | en_GB |
dc.subject | two-stage games | en_GB |
dc.subject | turntaking | en_GB |
dc.title | Cooperation through Coordination in Two Stages | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 0167-2681 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | en_GB |