dc.contributor.author | Auerbach, JU | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-10-19T08:51:23Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-08-21 | |
dc.description.abstract | I study the extent of secure property rights a planner can implement. Agents can produce output, appropriate others’ output, or work in property rights enforcement. The planner pays enforcement personnel using taxes collected from producers who can hide income from taxation at a cost. The planner implements perfectly secure property rights by incentivizing production through redistributive taxation and absorbing potential appropriators as enforcement personnel. Both taxation and employment in enforcement institutionalize redistribution that would otherwise take place through appropriation. Higher costs of hiding income permit more redistributive taxation and less enforcement, leading to more production and higher welfare. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Published online 21 August 2018 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00199-018-1141-9 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/34354 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Springer Verlag | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Under embargo until 21 August 2019 in compliance with publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.rights | © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018 | en_GB |
dc.subject | Costly falsification | en_GB |
dc.subject | Institutions | en_GB |
dc.subject | Property rights | en_GB |
dc.subject | Enforcement | en_GB |
dc.title | Property rights enforcement with unverifiable incomes | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 0938-2259 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer Verlag via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Economic Theory | en_GB |