dc.contributor.author | Reinstein, D | |
dc.contributor.author | Riener, G | |
dc.contributor.author | Kellner, C | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-10-31T14:48:16Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-12-07 | |
dc.description.abstract | Should fundraisers ask a banker to donate “if he earns a bonus” or wait and ask after the bonus is known?
Standard EU theory predicts these approaches are equivalent; loss-aversion and signaling models predict a
larger commitment before the bonus is known; theories of affect predict the reverse. In five experiments incorporating
lab and field elements (N=1363), we solicited charitable donations from small lottery winnings,
varying the conditionality of donations between participants. Pooling across experiments, participants are
23% more likely to commit to donate from the winning income and commit 25% more when asked before
the lottery’s outcome is determined—relative to those asked to donate after they learn they have won. These
differences are strongly statistically significant. This represents the first evidence on how pro-social behavior
extends to conditional commitments over uncertain income, with implications for charitable fundraising,
giving pledges, and experimental methodology. | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | We would like to thank the Universities of Essex, Düsseldorf, Mannheim and Bonn for providing financial support
for our research. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 169, pp. 109-127. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.10.009 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/34573 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Under embargo until 07 December 2020 in compliance with publisher policy. | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V. | |
dc.subject | social preferences | en_GB |
dc.subject | contingent decision-making | en_GB |
dc.subject | signaling | en_GB |
dc.title | Ex-ante Commitments to "Give if you Win" Exceed Donations After a Win | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 0047-2727 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this record. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Journal of Public Economics | en_GB |