Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorReinstein, D
dc.contributor.authorRiener, G
dc.contributor.authorKellner, C
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-31T14:48:16Z
dc.date.issued2018-12-07
dc.description.abstractShould fundraisers ask a banker to donate “if he earns a bonus” or wait and ask after the bonus is known? Standard EU theory predicts these approaches are equivalent; loss-aversion and signaling models predict a larger commitment before the bonus is known; theories of affect predict the reverse. In five experiments incorporating lab and field elements (N=1363), we solicited charitable donations from small lottery winnings, varying the conditionality of donations between participants. Pooling across experiments, participants are 23% more likely to commit to donate from the winning income and commit 25% more when asked before the lottery’s outcome is determined—relative to those asked to donate after they learn they have won. These differences are strongly statistically significant. This represents the first evidence on how pro-social behavior extends to conditional commitments over uncertain income, with implications for charitable fundraising, giving pledges, and experimental methodology.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipWe would like to thank the Universities of Essex, Düsseldorf, Mannheim and Bonn for providing financial support for our research.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 169, pp. 109-127.en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.10.009
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/34573
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherElsevieren_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder embargo until 07 December 2020 in compliance with publisher policy. en_GB
dc.rights© 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.
dc.subjectsocial preferencesen_GB
dc.subjectcontingent decision-makingen_GB
dc.subjectsignalingen_GB
dc.titleEx-ante Commitments to "Give if you Win" Exceed Donations After a Winen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.identifier.issn0047-2727
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this record.en_GB
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Public Economicsen_GB


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record