| dc.description.abstract | Previous research indicates that cheap-talk promises promote cooperation. We
extend the empirical study of promises to a three person environment. Doing
this enabled us to study two features of promises in the naturally occurring world
that have not been studied in the previous literature. For one, we are able to
determine the impact of “contingent” promises, which refers to promises that
need to be kept (or broken) only in the event that another event first occurs.
Second, we were able to study “promise chains”, by which we mean a set of
sequentially-made promises. In both cases, we are able to apply existing theories
to these novel environments to predict promise keeping behavior. Consistent
with theory predictions, we find that promises are not necessary, and do not
change behavior, when incentives are aligned. When there is conflict of interest,
and when a promise is definite (that is, not contingent), we find that people are
indeed willing to forgo monetary payoff to keep their promises. However, when
the promise is contingent, promises no longer promote cooperation: people are
equally like to choose a selfish action regardless whether they made a promise.
Finally, we find that promise chains do not promote trustworthiness, with people
at the end of the chain no more likely to honor their promises than people at
earlier positions, despite the additional indirect harm that people later in the
chain cause by defecting. Our findings offer insights relevant for the behavioral
economic theory of guilt aversion. | en_GB |
