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dc.contributor.authorGall, T
dc.contributor.authorReinstein, D
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-05T11:18:33Z
dc.date.issued2019-03-15
dc.description.abstractWhen Al makes an offer to Betty that Betty observes and rejects, Al may suffer a painful and costly “loss of face” (LoF). LoF can be avoided by letting the vulnerable side move second, or by setting up “Conditionally Anonymous Environments” that only reveal when both parties say yes. This can impact bilateral matching problems, e.g., marriage markets, research partnering, and international negotiations. We model this assuming asymmetric information, continuous signals of individuals’ binary types, linear marriage production functions, and a primitive LoF term component to utility. LoF makes rejecting one’s match strictly preferred to being rejected, making the “high types always reject” equilibrium stable. LoF may have non-monotonic effects on stable interior equilibria. A small LoF makes high types more selective, making marriage less common and more assortative. A greater LoF (for males only) makes low-type-males reverse snobs, which makes high-females less choosy, with ambiguous effects on the marriage rate.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationPublished online 15 March 2019.en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/oep/gpz018
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/34996
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherOxford University Press (OUP)en_GB
dc.relation.replaces10871/20734
dc.relation.replaceshttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/20734
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder embargo until 15 March 2021 in compliance with publisher policy.
dc.rights© Oxford University Press 2019. All rights reserved.
dc.subjectMatchingen_GB
dc.subjectmarriage marketsen_GB
dc.subjectanonymityen_GB
dc.subjectreputationen_GB
dc.subjectadverse selectionen_GB
dc.subjectBayesian gamesen_GB
dc.subjectemotionsen_GB
dc.titleLosing Faceen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2018-12-05T11:18:33Z
pubs.merge-from10871/20734
pubs.merge-fromhttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/20734
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Oxford University Press via the DOI in this record.en_GB
dc.identifier.journalOxford Economic Papersen_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2018-11-23
rioxxterms.versionAMen_GB
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2018-12-05T11:13:24Z
refterms.versionFCDAM


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