Scoping the strengths and weaknesses of different auction and PES mechanisms for Countryside Stewardship
Elliott, J; Day, B; Jones, G; et al.Binner, A; Smith, GS; Skirvin, D; Boatman, ND; Tweedie, F
Date: 31 August 2015
Publisher
ADAS
Abstract
The majority of farmers in England currently receive a fixed fee for managing their land under an agrienvironment scheme (Environmental Stewardship), which is based on an estimate of the typical income
forgone by participating. The aim of this research is to explore alternative mechanisms for allocating
agri-environment contracts ...
The majority of farmers in England currently receive a fixed fee for managing their land under an agrienvironment scheme (Environmental Stewardship), which is based on an estimate of the typical income
forgone by participating. The aim of this research is to explore alternative mechanisms for allocating
agri-environment contracts with a view to achieving a more cost-efficient and effective use of funds. The
focus is on reverse auctions, whereby farmers opt into a bidding process, offering to manage their land
under prescribed management options at a price that more closely reflects their cost of doing so. The
researchers have used a combination of laboratory experiments, simulation modelling and farmer
workshops to consider the opportunity for efficiency gains, aspects of auction design and farmer
responses to auctions.
A secondary objective of the work is to explore opportunities for the private sector to engage in agrienvironment actions by leveraging match-funding where there are common goals and mutual benefits
for private firms and society. This has entailed a review of the payment for ecosystem services (PES)
literature and consultations with a number of relevant private firms. A particular focus for the latter has
been the water companies, as they have already established some initiatives on PES around improving
water quality.
Economics
Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy
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