Richard Swinburne's arguments for substance dualism.
Horner, D
Date: 13 May 2019
Publisher
University of Exeter
Degree Title
MA by Research in Theology and Religion
Abstract
This dissertation is a contribution to debates in the philosophy of mind and of personal identity. It presents a critical account of arguments for substance dualism to be found in Richard Swinburne’s Mind, Brain, and Free Will (2013). Swinburne’s principal claim is that persons are essentially pure mental substances whose sameness over ...
This dissertation is a contribution to debates in the philosophy of mind and of personal identity. It presents a critical account of arguments for substance dualism to be found in Richard Swinburne’s Mind, Brain, and Free Will (2013). Swinburne’s principal claim is that persons are essentially pure mental substances whose sameness over time is constituted by a unique ‘thisness’. A human being consists of two parts: a contingent part, the body (physical substance), and an essential part, the mind or soul (pure mental substance) which is characterised by ‘thisness’. It is, on this account, logically and metaphysically possible that a person can be disembodied. The dissertation analyses Swinburne’s relationship to other major theories in the philosophy of mind, especially his critical rejection of physicalism and materialism. Swinburne mounts a defence of substance dualism by building upon some key fundamental ideas and principles. The first area of discussion is Swinburne’s novel contention that any satisfactory account of the mental and physical lives of human beings must meet the requirements of a ‘metacriterion’ which supports his division of the world into physical and mental substances, properties, events and time. Swinburne underpins the metacriterion by proposing a canonical vocabulary based on a theory of informative designators. The main line of attack here is on the inadequacy of Swinburne’s theory of designation as a convincing theory of how language works and is used. Secondly, the metacriterion is complemented by a theory of privileged access of subjects to their mental events which is not available to others. Criticism of this doctrine is derived from the work of Austin, Ryle and Wittgenstein. Thirdly, Swinburne deploys the principles of credulity and testimony to defend the causal interaction of mental and physical substances. He claims the principles are fundamental, a priori, and epistemic. The argument of the dissertation is that they are none of these things. My conclusion is that Swinburne’s principal arguments for substance dualism and personal identity are unsound.
MbyRes Dissertations
Doctoral College
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