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dc.contributor.authorDas, K
dc.contributor.authorKlein, N
dc.contributor.authorSchmid, K
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-26T08:25:41Z
dc.date.issued2019-04-22
dc.description.abstractWe examine a two-player game with two-armed exponential bandits à la (Keller et al. in Econometrica 73:39–68, 2005), where players operate different technologies for exploring the risky option. We characterise the set of Markov perfect equilibria and show that there always exists an equilibrium in which the player with the inferior technology uses a cut-off strategy. All Markov perfect equilibria imply the same amount of experimentation but differ with respect to the expected speed of the resolution of uncertainty. If and only if the degree of asymmetry between the players is high enough, there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium in which both players use cut-off strategies. Whenever this equilibrium exists, it welfare dominates all other equilibria. This contrasts with the case of symmetric players, where there never exists a Markov perfect equilibrium in cut-off strategies.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationPublished online 22-April-2019en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00199-019-01193-9
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/37684
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherSpringer (part of Springer Nature)en_GB
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2019 This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en_GB
dc.subjectTwo-armed banditen_GB
dc.subjectHeterogeneous agentsen_GB
dc.subjectFree ridingen_GB
dc.subjectLearningen_GB
dc.titleStrategic Experimentation with Asymmetric Playersen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2019-06-26T08:25:41Z
dc.identifier.issn0938-2259
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer via the DOI in this record.en_GB
dc.identifier.journalEconomic Theoryen_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2019-04-08
rioxxterms.versionAMen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2019-04-08
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2019-06-26T08:04:42Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.dateFOA2019-06-26T08:25:49Z
refterms.panelCen_GB


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