Is Substance a πρὸς ἕν Notion? Aristotle on the Synonymy and Homonymy of Substance

Abstract

The question of whether substance is homonymous or synonymous is rarely raised as such in the vast literature on Aristotle’s theory of substance. The present paper aims at filling this gap by tracing Aristotle’s thoughts about how substance is said. It is argued that substance is (problematically) synonymous in the Categories, while homonymy is the right framework for understanding the hylomorphic model of substance that Aristotle presents in the Physics, the De Anima and the Metaphysics. The paper also discusses at some length whether the variety of homonymy that applies to substance on the hylomorphic model should be seen as an instance of πρὸς ἕν homonymy. The conclusion is that Aristotle considers this option, without endorsing it in a sufficiently consistent way or providing the details of how it should work in the case of hylomorphism.