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dc.contributor.authorZissimos, Ben
dc.contributor.departmentEconomicsen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-04-11T08:51:25Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.description.abstractThis paper identifies a new terms-of-trade externality that is exercised through tariff setting. A North-South model of international trade is introduced in which the number of countries in each region can be varied. As the number of countries in one region is increased, each government there competes more aggressively with the others in its region, by lowering its tariff, to attract imports from the other region. In doing so, all countries in a region exert a negative terms-of-trade externality on each other, collectively undermining their own terms of trade and welfare. This externality can increase efficiency if the numbers of countries in both regions are increased simultaneously.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 78, Issue 2, pp. 276 - 286en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jinteco.2009.04.003
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/8223
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherElsevieren_GB
dc.relation.sourcePost-print version revised March 2009. Final version published in Journal of International Economics; available online at http://www.journals.elsevier.com/en_GB
dc.subjectComparative staticsen_GB
dc.subjectefficiencyen_GB
dc.subjectNorth-Southen_GB
dc.subjecttariff waren_GB
dc.subjectterms of tradeen_GB
dc.titleOptimum tariffs and retaliation: how country numbers matteren_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2013-04-11T08:51:25Z
dc.identifier.issn0022-1996
dc.descriptionPost-print dated March 2009. Final version published by Elsevier; available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com/en_GB
dc.identifier.journalJournal of International Economicsen_GB


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