The benefits of costly voting

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The benefits of costly voting

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10036/109382

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Title: The benefits of costly voting
Author: Chakravarty, Surajeet
Kaplan, Todd R.
Myles, Gareth D.
Publisher: University of Exeter Business School
Date Issued: 2010-02
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10036/109382
Links: http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/topics/economics/outputs/publication/?id=628 http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/economics/papers/
Abstract: We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be. By having a cost to voting, only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost. Hence, the outcome will be determined by voters with higher valuations. We show that in such a case welfare may be enhanced. Such an effect occurs when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and a high enough expected value.
Type: Working Paper
Description: Discussion paper
Keywords: votingvaluation
ISSN: 1473 – 3307


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