The benefits of costly voting

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The benefits of costly voting

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dc.contributor.author Chakravarty, Surajeet en_GB
dc.contributor.author Kaplan, Todd R. en_GB
dc.contributor.author Myles, Gareth D. en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2010-08-10T11:22:55Z en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-25T10:26:10Z en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2013-03-19T15:53:30Z
dc.date.issued 2010-02 en_GB
dc.description.abstract We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be. By having a cost to voting, only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost. Hence, the outcome will be determined by voters with higher valuations. We show that in such a case welfare may be enhanced. Such an effect occurs when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and a high enough expected value. en_GB
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10036/109382 en_GB
dc.language.iso en en_GB
dc.publisher University of Exeter Business School en_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics Department discussion papers series en_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries 10/05 en_GB
dc.relation.url http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/topics/economics/outputs/publication/?id=628 en_GB
dc.relation.url http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/economics/papers/ en_GB
dc.subject voting en_GB
dc.subject valuation en_GB
dc.title The benefits of costly voting en_GB
dc.type Working Paper en_GB
dc.date.available 2010-08-10T11:22:55Z en_GB
dc.date.available 2011-01-25T10:26:10Z en_US
dc.date.available 2013-03-19T15:53:30Z
dc.identifier.issn 1473 – 3307 en_GB
dc.description Discussion paper en_GB


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