Government policy towards multi-national corporations
Kaplan, Todd R.; Luski, Israel; Wettstein, David
Date: 20 May 2003
Journal
Economics Bulletin
Publisher
Vanderbilt University
Abstract
We analyze an environment with asymmetric information where a country tries to attract a multi-national corporation. The country can use both taxes and grants to meet its objective of maximizing net revenues. We show that when the country has private information it can often convey it via its choice of a tax-grant pair. When the tax ...
We analyze an environment with asymmetric information where a country tries to attract a multi-national corporation. The country can use both taxes and grants to meet its objective of maximizing net revenues. We show that when the country has private information it can often convey it via its choice of a tax-grant pair. When the tax rates are unbounded the country is able to extract the full surplus. The existence of an upper bound can in some cases reduce the payoff to a stronger country.
Economics
Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy
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