Government policy towards multi-national corporations

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Government policy towards multi-national corporations

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dc.contributor.author Kaplan, Todd R. en_GB
dc.contributor.author Luski, Israel en_GB
dc.contributor.author Wettstein, David en_GB
dc.contributor.department University of Exeter; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2008-04-03T11:12:37Z en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-25T10:25:31Z en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2013-03-19T15:56:42Z
dc.date.issued 2003-05-20 en_GB
dc.description.abstract We analyze an environment with asymmetric information where a country tries to attract a multi-national corporation. The country can use both taxes and grants to meet its objective of maximizing net revenues. We show that when the country has private information it can often convey it via its choice of a tax-grant pair. When the tax rates are unbounded the country is able to extract the full surplus. The existence of an upper bound can in some cases reduce the payoff to a stronger country. en_GB
dc.identifier.citation Economics Bulletin, May 2003 6 (3): 1-8 en_GB
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10036/22212 en_GB
dc.language.iso en en_GB
dc.publisher Vanderbilt University en_GB
dc.relation.url http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2003/volume6/EB-02F00002A.pdf en_GB
dc.subject Foreign Direct Investment en_GB
dc.subject Multi-National Corporations en_GB
dc.subject Signalling en_GB
dc.subject Tax Holidays en_GB
dc.title Government policy towards multi-national corporations en_GB
dc.type Article en_GB
dc.date.available 2008-04-03T11:12:37Z en_GB
dc.date.available 2011-01-25T10:25:31Z en_US
dc.date.available 2013-03-19T15:56:42Z
dc.identifier.journal Economics Bulletin en_GB


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