The strategic use of seller information in private-value auctions

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The strategic use of seller information in private-value auctions

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dc.contributor.author Kaplan, Todd R. en_GB
dc.contributor.author Zamir, Shmuel en_GB
dc.contributor.department University of Exeter; Hebrew University en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2008-06-04T11:28:29Z en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-25T10:25:35Z en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2013-03-19T15:56:58Z
dc.date.issued 2000-07 en_GB
dc.description.abstract In the framework of a first-price private-value auction, we study the seller as a player in a game with the buyers in which he has private information about their realized valuations. We find that depending upon his information, set of signals, and commitment power, he may strategically transmit messages to buyers in order to increase his revenue. In an environment where the seller knows the rankings and lacks any commitment power, we find that the seller is unable to exploit his information. However, in an environment where the seller knows the realized valuations and can credibly announce either the true rankings or the true values (or announce nothing at all) but cannot commit as to which of these truthful messages to announce, then it is indeed possible to increase his revenue. If the seller, in addition, can commit to the full signaling strategy, then his expected revenue will be even higher. We believe that this line of research is fruitful for both better understanding behavior in auctions and finding paths to higher seller revenue. en_GB
dc.identifier.doi 10.2139/ssrn.235269 en_GB
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10036/29470 en_GB
dc.language.iso en en_GB
dc.publisher SSRN en_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries Hebrew University, Center For Rationality en_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Paper No. 221 en_GB
dc.relation.url http://ssrn.com/abstract=235269 en_GB
dc.subject Information transmission en_GB
dc.subject auctions en_GB
dc.subject cheap talk en_GB
dc.subject verifiability en_GB
dc.title The strategic use of seller information in private-value auctions en_GB
dc.type Working Paper en_GB
dc.date.available 2008-06-04T11:28:29Z en_GB
dc.date.available 2011-01-25T10:25:35Z en_US
dc.date.available 2013-03-19T15:56:58Z
dc.identifier.issn 15565068 en_GB
dc.identifier.journal SSRN Electronic Journal en_GB


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