Ambiguity in partnerships

Kelsey, David; Spanjers, Willy
Date: 1 July 2004
Journal
The Economic Journal
Publisher
Blackwell
Publisher DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00230.x
Related links
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/loi/ECOJ
Abstract
The consequences of ambiguity for partnerships are addressed. Partnerships with symmetric linear production functions are analysed in a Choquet Expected Utility (CEU)-framework. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is extended to CEU-games. A class of sharing rules are proposed that make constructive use of strategic ambiguity in ...
The consequences of ambiguity for partnerships are addressed. Partnerships with symmetric linear production functions are analysed in a Choquet Expected Utility (CEU)-framework. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is extended to CEU-games. A class of sharing rules are proposed that make constructive use of strategic ambiguity in partnerships. Results on "ex ante" efficiency and "ex post" efficiency of the outcomes are presented.
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Economics

Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy

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