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Ambiguity in partnerships

dc.contributor.authorKelsey, Daviden_GB
dc.contributor.authorSpanjers, Willyen_GB
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Exeter; Kingston Universityen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-12T09:13:34Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-25T10:26:02Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:55:05Z
dc.date.issued2004-07en_GB
dc.description.abstractThe consequences of ambiguity for partnerships are addressed. Partnerships with symmetric linear production functions are analysed in a Choquet Expected Utility (CEU)-framework. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is extended to CEU-games. A class of sharing rules are proposed that make constructive use of strategic ambiguity in partnerships. Results on "ex ante" efficiency and "ex post" efficiency of the outcomes are presented.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipResearch supported by ESCR grant no. R000222597; by the British Academy and by the Commerzbank-Stiftungen_GB
dc.identifier.citationEconomic Journal, Vol. 114, No. 497, pp. 528-546, July 2004en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00230.xen_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/29944en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherBlackwellen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.blackwell-synergy.com/loi/ECOJen_GB
dc.subjectAmbiguityen_GB
dc.subjectpartnershipsen_GB
dc.titleAmbiguity in partnershipsen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2008-06-12T09:13:34Zen_GB
dc.date.available2011-01-25T10:26:02Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:55:05Z
dc.identifier.issn00130133en_GB
dc.identifier.issn14680297en_GB
dc.identifier.journalThe Economic Journalen_GB


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