Ambiguity in partnerships

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Ambiguity in partnerships

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dc.contributor.author Kelsey, David en_GB
dc.contributor.author Spanjers, Willy en_GB
dc.contributor.department University of Exeter; Kingston University en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2008-06-12T09:13:34Z en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-25T10:26:02Z en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2013-03-19T15:55:05Z
dc.date.issued 2004-07 en_GB
dc.description.abstract The consequences of ambiguity for partnerships are addressed. Partnerships with symmetric linear production functions are analysed in a Choquet Expected Utility (CEU)-framework. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is extended to CEU-games. A class of sharing rules are proposed that make constructive use of strategic ambiguity in partnerships. Results on "ex ante" efficiency and "ex post" efficiency of the outcomes are presented. en_GB
dc.description.sponsorship Research supported by ESCR grant no. R000222597; by the British Academy and by the Commerzbank-Stiftung en_GB
dc.identifier.citation Economic Journal, Vol. 114, No. 497, pp. 528-546, July 2004 en_GB
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00230.x en_GB
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10036/29944 en_GB
dc.language.iso en en_GB
dc.publisher Blackwell en_GB
dc.relation.url http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/loi/ECOJ en_GB
dc.subject Ambiguity en_GB
dc.subject partnerships en_GB
dc.title Ambiguity in partnerships en_GB
dc.type Article en_GB
dc.date.available 2008-06-12T09:13:34Z en_GB
dc.date.available 2011-01-25T10:26:02Z en_US
dc.date.available 2013-03-19T15:55:05Z
dc.identifier.issn 00130133 en_GB
dc.identifier.issn 14680297 en_GB
dc.identifier.journal The Economic Journal en_GB


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