Present-bias and externalities: Can government intervention raise welfare?
dc.contributor.author | Kotsogiannis, C | |
dc.contributor.author | Schwager, R | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-22T10:24:49Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022-03-10 | |
dc.date.updated | 2021-11-22T09:14:20Z | |
dc.description.abstract | Quasi-hyperbolic discounted preferences imply that consumers overemphasize immediate current rewards and overlook future ones (they have a ‘bias for the present’). Within this context the literature has emphasized that the misalignment between immediate and future rewards can be rectified by government policy. Importantly, it has also been shown that intervention by a government which shares the same biased intertemporal preferences with consumers does not deliver welfare improvements. Focusing on the latter, this paper identifies conditions under which in the presence of quasi-hyperbolic preferences, and a market imperfection (which takes the form of a negative externality), intervention by a present-biased government is welfare enhancing. This is the case if the market imperfection is sufficiently strong or the consumers’ bias for the present is weak. | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Published online 10 March 2022 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/caje.12572 | |
dc.identifier.grantnumber | ES/S00713X/1 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/127910 | |
dc.identifier | ORCID: 0000-0002-1081-4046 (Kotsogiannis, Christos) | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Wiley / Canadian Economics Association | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2022 The Authors. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’économique published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Canadian Economics Association. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. | |
dc.subject | Quasi-hyperbolic preferences | en_GB |
dc.subject | Optimal savings | en_GB |
dc.subject | Bias for the present | en_GB |
dc.subject | Time consistent policy | en_GB |
dc.subject | Externalities. | en_GB |
dc.title | Present-bias and externalities: Can government intervention raise welfare? | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-22T10:24:49Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1540-5982 | |
dc.description | This is the final version. Available on open access from Wiley via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Canadian Journal of Economics | en_GB |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2021-11-19 | |
rioxxterms.version | VoR | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2021-11-19 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2021-11-22T09:14:33Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | AM | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2022-03-28T13:47:51Z | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2022 The Authors. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’économique published by Wiley
Periodicals LLC on behalf of Canadian Economics Association.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.