Optimism and pessimism in games (article)
Kelsey, David; Eichberger, Jürgen
Date: 22 April 2014
Journal
International Economic Review
Publisher
Wiley
Publisher DOI
Related links
Abstract
This article considers the impact of ambiguity in strategic situations. It extends the existing literature on games with ambiguity-averse players by allowing for optimistic responses to ambiguity. We use the CEU model of ambiguity with a class of capacities introduced by Jaffrray and Philippe (Mathematics of Operations Research 22 ...
This article considers the impact of ambiguity in strategic situations. It extends the existing literature on games with ambiguity-averse players by allowing for optimistic responses to ambiguity. We use the CEU model of ambiguity with a class of capacities introduced by Jaffrray and Philippe (Mathematics of Operations Research 22 (1997), 165–85), which allows us to distinguish ambiguity from ambiguity-attitude, and propose a new solution concept, equilibrium under ambiguity (EUA), for players who may be characterized by ambiguity-preference. Applying EUA, we study comparative statics of changes in ambiguity-attitude in games with strategic complements. This extends work in Eichberger and Kelsey (Journal of Economic Theory 106 (2002), 436–66) on the effects of increasing ambiguity if players are ambiguity averse.
Economics
Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy
Item views 0
Full item downloads 0